Political Science · Ch 11 — India’s External Relations
The Policy of non-alignment
The Policy of non-alignment
The foreign policy of a newly independent country is never written on a blank slate. It is shaped by the history of its freedom struggle, the personality of its leaders, and the harsh realities of the world it enters. For India, that world was the Cold War — a global confrontation between two armed camps led by the United States and the Soviet Union. The policy of non-alignment was India’s answer to that world: a strategy to preserve sovereignty, pursue development, and carve out an independent voice in international affairs.
The roots of non-alignment: from the freedom struggle to the Cold War
India’s national movement was never isolated. It was part of a worldwide struggle against colonialism and imperialism, and it inspired liberation movements across Asia and Africa. Even before independence, Indian nationalist leaders maintained contacts with leaders of other colonies, united by a common enemy. The clearest example of this linkage was the creation of the Indian National Army (INA) by Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose during the Second World War — a direct connection between India’s struggle and overseas Indians.
A nation’s foreign policy reflects the interplay of domestic and external factors. The noble ideals that inspired India’s freedom struggle naturally influenced the making of its foreign policy. But India’s independence coincided with the beginning of the Cold War — a period of political, economic, and military confrontation between the US-led and USSR-led blocs. At the same time, the world saw the establishment of the United Nations, the creation of nuclear weapons, the emergence of Communist China, and the beginning of decolonisation. India’s leadership had to pursue national interests within this difficult international context.
The constitutional foundation: Article 51
The Indian Constitution itself laid down the principles for foreign policy. Article 51, a Directive Principle of State Policy, states:
The State shall endeavour to:
- (a) Promote international peace and security
- (b) Maintain just and honourable relations between nations
- (c) Foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised people with one another
- (d) Encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration
These principles were not mere rhetoric — they became the guiding framework for India’s external relations in the first two decades after independence.
Nehru’s role: the architect of India’s foreign policy
Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, played a crucial role in setting the national agenda. He was his own foreign minister, and from 1946 to 1964 he exercised profound influence in the formulation and implementation of India’s foreign policy.
The three major objectives of Nehru’s foreign policy were:
- To preserve the hard-earned sovereignty
- To protect territorial integrity
- To promote rapid economic development
Nehru wished to achieve these objectives through the strategy of non-alignment.
There were, of course, parties and groups in the country that believed India should be more friendly with the US-led bloc because that bloc claimed to be pro-democracy. Leaders like Dr B.R. Ambedkar thought along these lines. Political parties opposed to communism — such as the Bharatiya Jan Sangh and later the Swatantra Party — also wanted India to follow a pro-US foreign policy. But Nehru possessed considerable leeway in formulating foreign policy, and his vision prevailed.
Distance from two camps: the core of non-alignment
India’s foreign policy vigorously pursued the dream of a peaceful world by advocating non-alignment, reducing Cold War tensions, and contributing human resources to UN peacekeeping operations.
Why did India not join either camp? The answer is simple: India wanted to keep away from the military alliances led by the US and the Soviet Union against each other. During the Cold War, the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact came into existence. India advocated non-alignment as the ideal foreign policy approach.
This was a difficult balancing act, and sometimes the balance did not appear perfect. Consider two events from 1956:
- When Britain attacked Egypt over the Suez Canal issue, India led the world protest against this neo-colonial invasion.
- But in the same year, when the USSR invaded Hungary, India did not join its public condemnation.
Despite such inconsistencies, by and large India took an independent stand on various international issues and could get aid and assistance from members of both blocs.
Nehru’s own words from a letter to K.P.S. Menon in January 1947 capture the essence of this approach: “Our general policy is to avoid entanglement in power politics and not to join any group of powers as against any other group. The two leading groups today are the Russian bloc and the Anglo-American bloc. We must be friendly to both and yet not join either. Both America and Russia are extraordinarily suspicious of each other as well as of other countries. This makes our path difficult and we may well be suspected by each of leaning towards the other. This cannot be helped.”
Unease with the US and the economic dimension
While India was trying to convince other developing countries about the policy of non-alignment, Pakistan joined the US-led military alliances. The US was not happy about India’s independent initiatives and the policy of non-alignment. Therefore, there was considerable unease in Indo-US relations during the 1950s. The US also resented India’s growing partnership with the Soviet Union.
The economic dimension is important here. India adopted a strategy of planned economic development that emphasised import-substitution. The emphasis on developing a resource base meant that export-oriented growth was limited. This development strategy limited India’s economic interaction with the outside world, reinforcing the policy of keeping a distance from both blocs.
Afro-Asian unity: from Bandung to the NAM
Given its size, location, and power potential, Nehru envisaged a major role for India in world affairs, especially in Asian affairs. His era was marked by the establishment of contacts between India and other newly independent states in Asia and Africa. …
The figure is a reproduction of a letter written by Jawaharlal Nehru to K. P. S. Menon in January 1947 — that is, before India’s independence. The letter itself is the central object shown. It is handwritten on plain paper, with Nehru’s signature visible at the bottom. The text of the letter is quoted in the textbook margin, and the figure simply displays the original document alongside that quote.
What the letter says is crucial: Nehru writes that India’s general policy is “to avoid entanglement in power politics and not to join any group of powers as against any other group.” He names the two leading groups as “the Russian bloc and the Anglo-American bloc” and states that India must be friendly to both yet join neither. He acknowledges that both America and Russia are suspicious of each other and of other countries, making India’s path difficult — each side may suspect India of leaning toward the other. This, he says, “cannot be helped.”
The figure teaches that the policy of non-alignment was not a post-independence afterthought. It was being thought through and articulated even before India became independent. Nehru was already laying down the principle of staying out of military blocs while maintaining friendly relations with both superpowers. The letter shows that Nehru understood the Cold War would force difficult choices, and he was preparing for that reality.
The document is a primary source — a piece of historical evidence. It shows students that foreign policy is not just abstract theory; it is shaped by real people making real decisions in real time. The handwritten letter also humanises Nehru: it is not an official typed memorandum but a personal communication to a diplomat, revealing his candid assessment of the international situation. …
The figure is a reproduction of a handwritten letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to K. P. S. Menon, dated January 1947. K. P. S. Menon was a senior Indian diplomat who later served as India’s first foreign secretary. The letter is shown as a scanned document — a single page of lined paper, filled with Nehru’s own handwriting in ink. At the top, the date “January 1947” is written, and the salutation reads “My dear K. P. S.” The body of the letter contains the exact passage quoted in the textbook’s margin: “Our general policy is to avoid entanglement in power politics and not to join any group of powers as against any other group. The two leading groups today are the Russian bloc and the Anglo-American bloc. We must be friendly to both and yet not join either. Both America and Russia are extraordinarily suspicious of each other as well as of other countries. This makes our path difficult and we may well be suspected by each of leaning towards the other. This cannot be helped.” The letter is signed “Yours sincerely, Jawaharlal Nehru.”
The figure does not show any maps, arrows, panels, or diagrams — it is purely a photographic reproduction of a primary source document. Its purpose is to give students direct, visual access to Nehru’s own words, written just months before India’s independence, laying out the core logic of non-alignment. The letter makes clear that Nehru saw the Cold War as a choice between two hostile blocs — the Soviet-led “Russian bloc” and the US-led “Anglo-American bloc” — and that India’s policy would be to remain friendly with both while joining neither. He acknowledges the difficulty: each superpower would suspect India of leaning toward the other. This is not a later, polished doctrine but a private, candid statement of strategy. …