A Revolt in the Countryside — The Bombay Deccan

Understanding the Revolt: Why the Deccan Countryside Erupted in 1875

The revolt in the Bombay Deccan in 1875 was not a sudden, senseless outburst. It was the climax of decades of slow, grinding change that had transformed the lives of peasants (ryots) under colonial rule. By studying this revolt — the burning of account books, the attacks on moneylenders — we can peel back the layers of peasant anger and see the hidden history of their suffering. Revolts produce records: alarmed officials investigated the causes, and those enquiries give historians a rare window into the world of the rural poor.

The movement began on 12 May 1875 in Supa, a large village in Poona (now Pune) district. Supa was a market centre where many shopkeepers and moneylenders (sahukars) lived. Ryots from surrounding villages gathered, attacked the shopkeepers, and demanded their bahi khatas (account books) and debt bonds. They burnt the khatas, looted grain shops, and in some cases set fire to sahukars' houses. From Poona the revolt spread to Ahmednagar, and over the next two months it covered an area of 6,500 square kilometres, affecting more than thirty villages. Everywhere the pattern was the same: sahukars were attacked, account books burnt, and debt bonds destroyed. Terrified, many sahukars fled, leaving their property behind.

British officials, alarmed by the scale of the uprising, saw the spectre of 1857. They established police posts, called in troops, arrested 951 people, and convicted many. It took several months to bring the countryside under control.

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The Roots of the Revolt: A Longer History of Change

Why did peasants burn bonds and deeds? To answer that, we must look at the deeper changes in the Deccan countryside over the nineteenth century.

A New Revenue System: The Ryotwari Settlement

When British rule expanded from Bengal to other parts of India, new revenue systems were imposed. The Permanent Settlement was rarely extended beyond Bengal. Why? After 1810, agricultural prices rose, increasing the income of Bengal zamindars. Since the revenue demand was fixed under the Permanent Settlement, the colonial state could not claim any share of this enhanced income. Keen to maximise its financial resources, the government needed a system that allowed it to capture rising land values.

There was also an intellectual reason. By the 1820s, the economist David Ricardo was a celebrated figure in England. Colonial officials had learnt Ricardian ideas in college. According to Ricardo, a landowner should only claim the "average rent" that prevailed at a given time. When land yielded more than this average rent, the landowner had a surplus that the state needed to tax. If not taxed, cultivators would turn into rentiers — people who live on rental income — and would not productively invest in improving the land. Many British officials believed that Bengal's zamindars had indeed become rentiers, leasing out land and living on rental incomes. So a different system was needed.

The system introduced in the Bombay Deccan was called the ryotwari settlement. Unlike the Bengal system, revenue was settled directly with the ryot (the cultivator). The average income from different soil types was estimated, the ryot's revenue-paying capacity was assessed, and a proportion of it was fixed as the state's share. The lands were resurveyed every 30 years, and revenue rates were increased. The revenue demand was no longer permanent.

Revenue Demand and Peasant Debt

The first revenue settlement in the Bombay Deccan was made in the 1820s. The revenue demanded was so high that in many places peasants deserted their villages and migrated to new regions. The problem was especially acute in areas of poor soil and fluctuating rainfall. When rains failed and harvests were poor, peasants could not pay the revenue. But collectors, keen to demonstrate efficiency and please their superiors, extracted payment with utmost severity. When someone failed to pay, his crops were seized and a fine was imposed on the whole village.

By the 1830s, the problem worsened. Agricultural prices fell sharply after 1832 and did not recover for over fifteen years. This meant a further decline in peasants' income. At the same time, a devastating famine struck in 1832-34. One-third of the cattle of the Deccan died, and half the human population perished. Survivors had no agricultural stocks to see them through the crisis. Unpaid balances of revenue mounted.

How did cultivators live through such years? They borrowed. Revenue could rarely be paid without a loan from a moneylender. But once a loan was taken, the ryot found it difficult to repay. As debt mounted, peasants' dependence on moneylenders increased. They now needed loans even to buy everyday necessities and meet production costs. By the 1840s, officials were finding evidence of alarming levels of peasant indebtedness everywhere.

By the mid-1840s, there were signs of economic recovery. Many British officials realised that the settlements of the 1820s had been too harsh. The revenue demand was exorbitant, the system rigid, and the peasant economy on the verge of collapse. So the revenue demand was moderated to encourage peasants to expand cultivation. After 1845, agricultural prices recovered steadily. Cultivators extended their acreage, moved into new areas, and transformed pastureland into cultivated fields. But to expand cultivation, they needed more ploughs, cattle, seeds, and land. For all this, they had to turn once again to moneylenders for loans.

Then Came the Cotton Boom

Before the 1860s, three-fourths of raw cotton imports into Britain came from America. British cotton manufacturers were worried about this dependence. What if the American supply was cut off? In 1857, the Cotton Supply Association was founded in Britain, and in 1859, the Manchester Cotton Company was formed. Their objective was "to encourage cotton production in every part of the world suited for its growth." India was seen as a country that could supply cotton to Lancashire — it had suitable soil, a favourable climate, and cheap labour.

When the American Civil War broke out in 1861, panic spread through British cotton circles. Raw cotton imports from America fell to less than three per cent of normal: from over 2,000,000 bales in 1861 to 55,000 bales in 1862. Frantic messages were sent to India and elsewhere to increase cotton exports. In Bombay, cotton merchants visited cotton districts to assess supplies and encourage cultivation. As cotton prices soared, export merchants gave advances to urban sahukars, who in turn extended credit to rural moneylenders who promised to secure the produce. When there is a boom, credit flows easily because lenders feel secure about recovering their money.

These developments had a profound impact on the Deccan countryside. Ryots suddenly found access to seemingly limitless credit. They were given Rs 100 as advance for every acre they planted with cotton. Sahukars were more than willing to extend long-term loans. While the American crisis continued, cotton production in the Bombay Deccan expanded. Between 1860 and 1864, cotton acreage doubled. By 1862, over 90 per cent of cotton imports into Britain were coming from India.

But these boom years did not bring prosperity to all. Some rich peasants did gain, but for the large majority, cotton expansion meant heavier debt.

Credit Dries Up

While the boom lasted, cotton merchants in India had visions of permanently displacing America from the world market. The editor of the Bombay Gazette asked in 1861, "What can prevent India from supplanting the Slave States (of U.S.A.) as the feeder of Lancashire?" By 1865, these dreams were over. As the Civil War ended, cotton production in America revived, and Indian cotton exports to Britain steadily declined. Export merchants and sahukars in Maharashtra were no longer keen on extending long-term credit. They could see demand for Indian cotton fall and prices slide downwards. So they decided to close down their operations, restrict advances to peasants, and demand repayment of outstanding debts.

While credit dried up, the revenue demand increased. The first revenue settlement had been in the 1820s and 1830s. Now it was time for the next settlement, and the demand was increased dramatically — from 50 to 100 per cent. How could ryots pay this inflated demand at a time when prices were falling and cotton fields disappearing? Yet again, they had to turn to the moneylender. But the moneylender now refused loans. He no longer had confidence in the ryots' capacity to repay.

The Experience of Injustice

The refusal of moneylenders to extend loans enraged the ryots. What infuriated them was not simply that they had got deeper into debt, or that they were utterly dependent on the moneylender for survival, but that moneylenders were violating the customary norms of the countryside. …