Q."Nuclear power has emerged as a viable source in recent years." Examine the statement with suitable arguments in the context of India.

Nuclear Power as a Viable Source in India

The statement holds considerable truth when viewed against India's energy landscape and strategic imperatives. Nuclear power contributes roughly 3% of India's total electricity generation, a modest but growing share that reflects both its potential and the challenges it faces.

India's nuclear programme began in the 1960s with research reactors and gained momentum after the commissioning of commercial plants at Tarapur and Rawatbhata. The country has developed indigenous reactor technology, including pressurised heavy-water reactors that use natural uranium, sidestepping dependence on enriched fuel. This self-reliance became critical after international sanctions following the 1974 nuclear test restricted access to foreign technology and fuel.

Arguments supporting viability:

• Nuclear plants provide baseload power with high capacity factors, complementing intermittent renewables like solar and wind.
• They produce negligible greenhouse gas emissions during operation, aligning with climate commitments.
• India's three-stage programme—using thorium in the final stage—promises long-term fuel security given the country's large thorium reserves.
• Recent capacity additions and plans for new reactors signal continued government commitment.

Challenges tempering viability: …

India's nuclear journey began with Jawaharlal Nehru's vision of scientific self-reliance and Homi Bhabha's three-stage programme designed to leverage the country's modest uranium reserves but vast thorium deposits. The first reactor at Tarapur came online in 1969, and for decades nuclear energy remained a small, strategically important but commercially marginal part of the power mix. The statement that nuclear power has "emerged as viable in recent years" invites us to weigh both the genuine advances and the persistent obstacles that shape its role in India's energy landscape.

Arguments supporting viability

Energy security and baseload stability

Nuclear plants run continuously at high capacity factors—often above 80%—providing reliable baseload power that neither solar nor wind can match without expensive storage. For a country still grappling with coal import bills and air quality crises, nuclear offers a domestic, low-carbon alternative that does not depend on monsoon hydrology or daily sunshine.

Carbon neutrality and climate commitments

India has pledged to reach net-zero emissions by 2070 and to install 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030. Nuclear energy produces negligible greenhouse gases during operation, making it an attractive complement to renewables in decarbonising the grid. Recent global climate discourse has rehabilitated nuclear as a "clean" technology, and India has echoed this framing in policy documents.

Technological maturity and indigenous capability

The Department of Atomic Energy now designs and builds pressurised heavy-water reactors domestically. The fleet of 22 operating reactors demonstrates that India can construct, operate, and maintain nuclear plants without wholesale foreign dependence. The 2008 civil nuclear agreement with the United States and subsequent Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver opened access to international fuel and technology, easing earlier constraints.

Expansion plans and new projects

Ten reactors are under construction, which will add roughly 8,000 MW to the current installed capacity of about 7,500 MW. The government has approved sites for additional units and continues to allocate budget to the nuclear programme, signalling policy commitment.

Arguments questioning viability

High capital costs and long gestation periods

Nuclear plants are extraordinarily expensive to build—often two to three times the per-MW cost of coal or gas plants—and take a decade or more from approval to commissioning. The Kudankulam units, built with Russian assistance, faced years of delay and cost overruns. In an era when solar tariffs have plummeted below ₹2 per unit and can be deployed in months, nuclear struggles to compete on pure economics.

Fuel supply and import dependence

India's uranium reserves are limited, and domestic mines have not kept pace with reactor demand. The country imports a significant fraction of its nuclear fuel from Kazakhstan, Russia, and Canada. This undermines the energy-security argument and exposes the programme to geopolitical risk and price volatility.

Safety and public acceptance

The Fukushima disaster in 2011 galvanised anti-nuclear sentiment worldwide, and India was no exception. Protests at Kudankulam delayed the plant for years; communities near proposed sites in Jaitapur and elsewhere remain wary. The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, while amended, still raises concerns among foreign vendors about financial exposure in the event of an accident, deterring investment.

Slow capacity addition relative to renewables

Between 2015 and 2023, India added roughly 120 GW of renewable capacity but only about 2 GW of nuclear. The share of nuclear in total generation has hovered around 3% for years and is projected to remain modest even if all planned reactors come online. Renewables, not nuclear, are driving the energy transition in practice.

Waste management and decommissioning

India has yet to operationalise a permanent repository for high-level radioactive waste. Spent fuel is stored on-site at reactors, and the long-term environmental and financial liabilities of decommissioning remain unquantified. These back-end costs, often excluded from headline tariff comparisons, weigh against viability. …