Q.Write an essay for or against the following proposition: “With the disintegration of the second world, India should change its foreign policy and focus more on friendship with the US rather than with traditional friends like Russia”.

The proposition assumes that the end of the Cold War forced India into a binary choice between the US and Russia. That assumption is flawed. India’s foreign policy realignment after 1991 was not a simple swap of one superpower for another; it was a pragmatic, multi-dimensional shift to survive in a unipolar world.

First, India did deepen ties with the US — economic reforms required American investment and technology, and the 1998 nuclear tests led to a strategic partnership under the 2005 nuclear deal. But this was never at the cost of Russia. Russia remained India’s key supplier of defence equipment and a veto-wielding partner in the UN Security Council. India’s “Look East” policy and engagement with ASEAN, the EU, and Japan show that it pursued multiple friendships, not a single alliance.

Second, abandoning Russia would have been strategically reckless. Russia provides India with nuclear submarines, hypersonic missiles, and a reliable partner in Central Asia — assets the US has never offered. India’s traditional non-alignment evolved into “multi-alignment”: the ability to maintain strategic autonomy by keeping all major powers as friends, not enemies. …

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was not just the end of a superpower — it was the end of the world India had known. For four decades, India’s foreign policy had been anchored in the Non-Aligned Movement, with the USSR as its most reliable partner: a veto-wielding friend at the UN, a supplier of cheap defence equipment, and a strategic counterweight to Pakistan’s alliance with the US and China. When that world disintegrated, India faced a stark question: should it now pivot entirely toward the United States, the sole remaining superpower?

The proposition that India should “focus more on friendship with the US rather than with traditional friends like Russia” sounds logical on the surface. After 1991, the US was the dominant economic and military power. It controlled the IMF and World Bank, which India desperately needed after the 1991 balance-of-payments crisis. American markets and technology seemed essential for India’s new economic reforms. Moreover, the US and India shared a growing concern about China’s rise — a common interest that could form the basis of a strategic partnership.

Yet a complete abandonment of Russia would have been a grave mistake. Russia, though weakened, remained a nuclear power and a permanent UN Security Council member. It still possessed advanced military technology that India’s armed forces were built around — from MiG fighters to T-72 tanks to nuclear submarines. Switching entirely to US equipment would have been prohibitively expensive and logistically chaotic. More importantly, Russia had never imposed sanctions on India or demanded concessions on Kashmir, unlike the US, which periodically pressured India on human rights and non-proliferation.

What India actually did was far more sophisticated than either extreme. It did not choose between Russia and the US — it chose both. This is often called “multi-alignment” or “strategic autonomy.” India deepened ties with the US through the 2005 civil nuclear deal, joint military exercises, and intelligence sharing. At the same time, it maintained its “special and privileged strategic partnership” with Russia, continuing to buy S-400 missile systems, lease nuclear submarines, and coordinate at the UN on issues like Afghanistan and Syria.

Consider the evidence. When the US imposed sanctions on Russia after its 2014 annexation of Crimea, India went ahead with the S-400 deal despite the threat of American CAATSA sanctions. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, India did not condemn Moscow at the UN — it abstained, while simultaneously buying discounted Russian oil and maintaining diplomatic engagement with both Washington and Kyiv. This is not the behaviour of a country that has “focused more” on one friend at the expense of another.

The proposition also underestimates the value of Russia as a counterweight. A world where India is entirely dependent on the US for defence supplies, diplomatic support, and energy would leave India vulnerable to American pressure. Russia provides an alternative — not as a replacement, but as a hedge. India can negotiate with the US from a position of strength precisely because it has other options.