Independence of Judiciary

Independence of the judiciary, stated simply, has three components. First, the other organs of government — the executive and the legislature — must not restrain the functioning of the judiciary in a way that leaves it unable to do justice. Second, the other organs must not interfere with the judiciary's decisions once made. Third, judges must be able to perform their functions without fear or favour — free to rule against a powerful minister or a private company exactly as they would rule against an ordinary citizen.

It is important not to over-read this. Independence of the judiciary does not mean the judiciary answers to no one — that would be arbitrariness, not independence. The judiciary is very much part of the democratic political structure of the country, and it remains accountable to the Constitution, to democratic traditions, and to the people.

The Constitution builds this independence into its design through several concrete mechanisms:

1. Appointment kept out of ordinary politics. The legislature is not involved in the process of appointing judges, so that party loyalty and political opinion do not become the test for who sits on the bench. What is expected instead is experience as a lawyer or expertise in law.
2. Security of tenure. Judges hold office until the age of retirement and can be removed only in exceptional cases, through a deliberately difficult procedure — the idea being that a judge who does not fear losing the job can rule without fear.
3. Financial independence. Salaries and allowances of judges are not subject to a vote of the legislature, so the purse strings cannot be used to pressure the bench. …